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in the Imper do not necessarily refled the views of tbe CBS.DEMYSTIFYING RATIONALEXPECTATIONS TI~.ORY THROUGH AN ECONOMIC-PSYCHO-
LOGICAL MODEL
Abstrad
The paper discusses expectation.c as economic and psychological concepts. Economists have shown
comparatively little interest in how survey expectations are formod. Psychological theories can enrich
the study of economic expectations and can fill in some empirical details where economic theories are
lacking. While there are some parallels between economic and psychological thinking, economists tend
to think in terms of either past experience or new infortnation and psychologists in terms of how past
experience and new information are integrated. Based on the latter ideas an economic-psychological
model is presented. It treats ezpectation.g as consisting of thrce sets of beliefs: beliefs based on (1) past
ezperience, (2) discrepancies betwcen eartier expectationc and outcomes, when expectations comprise
some degrce of perceived control, (3) new information. Each set of beliefs has a weight which can vary
from 0 to 1. Variations in these weights explain simple extrapolative, adaptive and rational
expectations. The model may also be applied in the study of consurtkr expectations ofproduct benefits.
It gives ideas, similar to inforniation integration theory, for laboratory experiments.
1. The Role of Expedations
1.1 The Purpose of the Paper
There are no facts about the future. All decisions and acts are based on expectations which are more
or less founded on earlier facts. Still, people may feel extremely sure about certain decisions and
course.s of action. Outcomes of actual events may fulfill the expectations or turn out to be more or less
different from what was expected, whether hoped for or feared. How do people form their expectations
and what determines the confidence they have in their expectations?
The purpose of the paper is to introduce a simple model of expectation formation which encapsulates
ideas both from economic theory and psychology. The model is used to illustrate the differerkes
between the economic theories of expectations and involves a reinterpretation in behavioral terms. The
theoretical support for the model is briefly discussed. It is claimed that the use of the model makes
it possible to reconcile economic and psychological thinking at least up to a point. Finally, relying on
earlier research in economics and psychology 1 discuss some implications for future research on
expectations. In my view, there should be much more focus on the role of new infomuuion for the
formation and changing of ezpectations, employing both surveys and laboratory experiments in the
research. As a simple illustration, the application of the model to some Dutch expectations data is
shown.
1.2 Ratioosl and Other Expedatioas
In economics, there is one dominating view: expectations are formed on the basis of information which
is dealt with in a rational way. Confidence in the expectations is often seen as a tnatter of the
credibility of the infotmation. Expectations occupy an important place ever since Keynes presented the
foundations of macroeconomics in the 30's. The new classical macroeconomic theory is even tnore
dependent on the concept of expectations than Keynesian er,onomics (Klamer, 1984). Rational
expectations theory which to most psychologists seems to lack empirical support and relevance is the
dominating expectations theory and the work on its implication.4 for economic behavior is pursued by
many researchers.
The basic idea behind rational expectations theory is that people use information about economic
events when they form their expectations and, furthermore, that they do this using the best of
economic knowledge (Muth, 1961). It is assumed that people form their expectations rationally. Like
any other economic behavior, the formation of expectations is assumed to be rational. Rational is used
in an ecorromic sense and not in the way psychologists tend to think of rationality, as a process. The
rational expectations theory provided a way of handling the influence of new economic infomtation
on expectations. Some ecottomists add a pinch of salt and think in terms of asymptotic rational
expectations, i.e.expectations are formed in rational processing of information, given enough time. This
is similar to Keynes's view of economic behavior as rational on average and over time.The sophisti-x
cated discussion4 of expectations in economic theory have, in my view, something psychologists and
economic psychologists in particular can learn from. This will be further developed in the following.
1.3 Expectations in Ernnomic-Psychological Research
Ezpectations constitute an important area of research in economic psychology. With few exceptions
there is little discussion of how economic-psychological theory of expectations can be improved (inter-
esting discussions can be found e.g. in Vanden Abeele, 1988, and Bechtel, De Meyer ard Vanden
Abeele, 1993). While the present main focus is on the measuremem of a few expectations through
survey interviews and very simple indezes like the Index of Consumer Sentiment or lndex ofConsumer
Expectations, there is room for drawing on both economics and psychology to develop economic-
psychological expectations theory. It should be acknowledged that the simple indexes used have shown
surprising usefulness in macroeconomic contexts (Biart and Praet, 1987).
With respect to economic-psychological research, 1 would like to make two main points: (1) that the
fornuuiort of expectations as measured in surveys is largely unknown and (2) the study of other
economic expectations than those relating to the business cycle is underraurished. Even though my
main interest in this paper is focussed on macroeconomic issues, 1 would like to express the opinion
that ín many marketing contexts there has been an unfortunate focus on attitudes rather than on
expectations and on how expectations are forttted and influenced. The formation of expectations seems
to be highly relevant when new products and other innovations are launched in the market.
2. ~tee Model
Based on economic and psychological theories of ezpectations which will be explained shortly, three
sets of beliefs are assumed to constitute expectations. The three sets have different importance in
different contexts, indicated by weights. In its simple, individual form the model looks like this:
EXP,.,-w,Bnfw,B~fw,B„
where
EXP-expecaation about period t,., stated at time to
B.-beliefs based on extrapolation of past experience
B,,-beliefs based on earlier discrepancies between expectations and outcomes (error-learning); this set
of beliefs operates primarily when the expectation is similar to a goal or plan, an intentionnl expecta-
tion (sce Vanden Abeele, 1988).
B,-beliefs based on new information; these beliefs can be divided into two sets of beliefs, one
pettaining to the individuallltousehold, the other to economy-wide information.
w„ w„ w, are (empirical) weights which can vary from 0 to I. If w,-1 the assumption is made that
the components are integrated by averaging rather than summation (cf. Busemeyer, 1991). This is
consistent with many findings in inforrnation integration theory (Anderson, 1991).
The basic idea is that expectations are formed and can be revised on the basis of past ezperience of
a phenomenon (or similar phenomena, involving generalization), learning from how successful earlier,
ituentional expectations were, and finally, on new information in the individual's immediate or more
distant environment. If the weight of one set of beliefs is equal to zero, the other sets are the basis for
forming an expectation. If the ezpectation is contingent, i.e. the outcome cannot be affected by
anything the holder of the expectation does, the weight of the ercor-learning beliefs is equal to zero.
Many expectations are simply founded on past experience which in terms of the model means that the
other two sets of beliefs have weights equal to uro or at least very low weights. In other cases, there
are no earlier experiences, but some information in the environment which will then serve to form the
expectation.3
A simple criterion for rational expectations is that the discrepancies between ezpectations and
realirations are minimal, that is, do not deviate significantly from zero. Eztrapolative as well as
adaptive expectations are then compatible with rational expectations if they give good enough
predictions. The third case involves that there is new infortnation to utilize, something which is not
handled by the extrapolative and adaptive expectations theories. In some, presumably rare cases the
new infortnation will have such dominance that other sets of beliefs get significantly low woights. More
will be said below about circumstances affecting the weights of the belief sets.
3. Expectatioas in Economics
3.1 Economic Theories of Expectatiot~s
l.et me first relate the model presented in the previous section to economic thinking about ezpecta-
tions. In economics three theories of expectations compete in the sense that they are seen as mutually
exclusive: one or the other holds: (I) simple eztrapolation of earlier experience, (2) adaptive ezpecta-
tions, based on learning from differences between outcomes and earlier ezpectations, and (3) rational
ezpectations. (() and (2) are actually two different ways of dealing with past ezperience. Past
ezperience usually refers to objective data on earlier development rather than to subjective experience
or perception of past developments. Extrapolative expectations are based on past experience which can
be weighted or unweighted. In weighted models, particular weight is usually given to recent experience.
Taking price level (inflation) ezpectations as an ezample, extrapolative expectations can be defined as
PE~ar - W,P, f WZP,-, f.. W.P~.
where PE,,, - expected price level in next period, assessed at time t
P; - realized price level at the end of period t, t-l, t-n
w„ w~, w, are empirical weights.
Adaptive ezpectations involve letting earlier discrepancies betwcen expectation and outcome affect the
new expectation. !t means correcting an expectation based on previous experience with some factor
the siu of which is related to earlier expectation-outcome discrepancies.
Adaptive ezpectations, again using price ezpectations as an example, are defined as follows:
PE,,, - PE, - a(P, - PE,J
which can be rewritten as
PE,,, - a P, f(J-a) PE,
or
PE,. r- PE, t a(P, - PE~
where 0 G a c 1.
The latter fortn defines an adaptive expectation as the ezpectation of last period, plus a correction of
part of last period's forecast error.
Nerlove ( 1983) found that the adaptive expectations theory which he called 'error-leatning' theory
explained certain expectations quite well for business firms in Germany and France. Based on
psychological thinking, the theory of adaptive expectations can be expected to make less sense for
consumers than for business decision makers. Consumers who are asked questions about their price
expectations in a survey can hardly be expected to remember what they answered siz months or a year
ago, unless they are specially motivated to remember or are reminded of their earlier answers. Income
expectations may at least for some survey respondents be more of intentional expectations. In the case4
of business decision makers the answers to questions about production and sales which presumably
cover intentional ezpectations may be based on budget data and similar records and a comparison of
expectation and outcome may be easily accomplished.
The original rational expectations theory was in simple temu explained in the following way:
"..expectations, since they are informed predictions of future events, are essentially the same as the
predictions of the relevant economic theory." (Muth, 1961, p. 316). The theory refetted to how
businessmen formed their expectations about prices and was inspired by two conclusions from earlier
studies of ezpectations:
1. Averages of expectations in an industry were more accurate than naive models and as accurate as
elaborate equation systems, although there were wide individual variations
2. Survey expectations generally underestimated the extrnt of changes actually taking place. There was
severe criticism of adaptive expectations theory, since adaptive expectations consistently underes-
timated actual expectations when there was steady growth. (Muth, 1961 p. 316)
A fotmal definition looks like this, taking price level as an example:
PE,., - E(P,., I 1J
where PE," - expected price level next period at t
E- the mathematical expectation (of P,,,at time t)
I, - the set of infotmation available at t
The rational expectation is then the mathematical expectation of the price level at time tfl,
conditional on the all the information available at time t.
Rational expectations are often defined in the following way which suggests a way of assessing whether
expectations are rational:
PE,~, - P,~, t u
where PE,., - expected price level for period tf 1, formed at the end of period t
P,,, - realized price level at the end of period tfl
u - stochastic error term.
Rationality implies that u has mean zero, there is no serial correlation, and zero correlation between
u and any information known at the time to the petson who is forming the expectation. This involves
complete, unbiased and efficient use of all information.
Rational expectations have been defined in somewhat varying terms: "The underlying idea is simply
that economic agents behave purposefully in collecting and using infotmation just as they do in other
activities. In this general fotm the hypothesis is a compelling one, but in practice this idea is often
translated into the requirement that expectations aze, in the model at hand, formed in a way that is
stochastically consistent with the behavior of the realized values of the variables in question." (Nerlove,
1983 p. 1254-1255). The theory of rational expectations is intended as a theory of how expectations of
a wide range of economic variables are fom~ed (Attfield, Emery and Duck, 1985, p. 11).
Rational expectations involve that earlier experience and new information are used in an optimal way
which means that they are treated as in economic theory. The rational expectations Iheory actually
overrides the other theories. While the main emphasis is on the use of new infomtation, the optimal
use of infortnation may sometimes involve pure extrapolation and sometimes an adaptive process, also
called ettor-leaming (Nerlove, t983).
So far researchers have shown only limited interest in how survey expectations are formed under the5
influence of external events, but a growing interest in the intricacies of survey measurements of
consunur attd business ezpectations can be rtoted (Nerlove, 1983; Lovell, 1986; Batchelor and Dua,
1992; Ivaldi, 1992). Maital and Maital (1981) discuss social influence on consumer expectations and
using some Israeli data, find that interpersonal trust had a significant influence on inflation
ezpectations as had also income and age. Batchelor, alone (Batchelor, 1986) and with a coauthor
(Batchelor and Dua, 1990a; 1990b; 1991; 1992) has, for ezample, paid considerable attention to infla-
tion expectations and used some ideas from psychophysics to elucidate the formation of such ezpecta-
tions. Batchelor and Dua (1990a; 1990b) also studied the predictive success of U.S. economic forecast-
ers. They found that those who made the best forecasts worked with specified econometric models
based on some ideology, in the first place Keynesian theory. The authors note that all forecasters
added a lot ofsubjective judgment to the model: they put more weight on judgmem than on any formal
modeling technique.
3.2 Testing the Ratiottal Expedatioas Theory
The reasoning around rational expectations implies that rational expectations are primarily a macro
concept. On average and over time ezpectations will tend to be rational, when the situation is not too
complez. 7'he limited cognitive capacity of humans make it unlikely that any human being has really
rational expectations (Simon, 1984; I990). Katona (1980) and Simon (1984) noted that one aim of
rational expectations theory was to make measurement of expectations unnecessary, an ambition they
did not share.
The original formulation of the rational expectations theory hardly admitted any empirical testing of
its validity. In Muth's (1961) first formulation it was a theory aimed at improving descriptions of
economic behavior of producers whose behavior was described through the so-called cobweb theorem.
The cobweb theorem explains the production of producers who relied on extrapolated, rnost recent
past experience and did not heed new information or learn from their errors. While some adherents
of the rational ezpectations theory still think that the theory cannot (and should not) be tested directly
against empirical data on subjective expectations (cf. Sheffrin, 1983), there are now several
formulations of the theory that invite such testing. There is a weak form of test that involves that the
discrepancies between ezpectation and outcome should on average be equal to zero (unbiased). A
stronger test means that there is no correlation between information available when the expectation
was formed and the expectation error (Attfield et al., 1985, pp. 106-109).
A simple delineation of rational ezpectations is that expectations are rational when there is no pattern
of systematic error: "Purposeful economic agents have incentives to eliminate such errors up to a point
justified by the costs of obtaining the information necessary to do so." (Nerlove, 1983, p. 1255). "The
most readily available and least costly information about the future value of a vaziable is its past
values." (Nerlove, 1983, p. 1255). Extrapolation of past experience may be the only information used
in some cases of expectation formation. If there is good agrcement between expectation and outcome,
at least one criterion for rationality is satisfied.
Tests of the rational expectations theory have been carried out using laboratory experiments and in
a somewhat different vein interview surveys. An early test of rational expectations was done by Brown
and Maital (1981). They showed that economic experts in the well-known Livingston panel
underutilized available information, particulazly data on monetary growth. The experts were partly, but
not fully rational. ln an earlier study, Maital (1979) found that a unit change in monetary growth had
the largest impact on inflation expectations of consumers. He found it unlikely, though, ".. that
pipefitters and stevedores furrow their brows over the latest figures on M„ M2, and excess reserves."
(Maital, 1979, p. 434)
Lovell (1986) reviews many of the tests performed so far. His conclusion was "..ifthe cumulative
evídence is to be believed, we are compelled to conclude that expectations are a rich and varied
phenomenon that is not adequately captured by the concept of rational expec[ations; while the predic-
tions of some forecasters may be characterized as rational, in other instances the assumption of
rationality is clearly violated." (Lovell, 1986, p. 120). He cites two reasons why the theory does not
seem to be borne out. One is simply measurement error and the other [he possibili[y that shifts in the
cnvironment may necessitate transient departures from rationality. It could be added that it is not6
always so easy, using even the best of economic theory, to know and pursue whal is rational as Akerlof
(1991) has amply demonstrated in a readable essay on procrastination and obedience.
As noted above, forecasters differ in predictive accuracy. Batchelor and Dua (1991) found that
individual forecasts were more likely to be rational if they were based on mainstream economic theory
and incorporated a substantial element of judgment. The latter is presumably due to the importance
of new infortnation. The pritnary aim of many of the tests seems to be to ascettain whether there aze
systematic errors when expectations and reali7ations are compared.
The test of the rational expectations hypothesis carried out by for ezample Ivaldi (1992) is so construed
that when the null hypothesis is not rejected the rational expectations hypothesis is accepted in the
sense that it is not rejected. Ivaldi's test involves that there is a correspondence between expectations
at time t-1 for time t and the appraisals of outcomes at time t. If there is agreement, the rational
expectations hypothesis is assumed to hold. This is, of coutse, not really a test of the rational
ezpectations hypothesis. It is not only a very weak test of fit, it errs in presupposing that the only way
to make accurate prediction or rather to have accurate expectations is to treat the available
infotmation in an optimal way, that is, as economíc theory prescribes. Arrow (1986) has emphatically
stressed that there are many plausible alternatives to the rationality assumption.
Baghestani (1992) tested the inflation expectations of households collected by Institute for Social
Research, University of Michigan. The test concetned the rationality ofthe survey expectations. "..when
forming inflationary ezpectations, economic agents could efficiently utiliu two fomu of information:
the weak form, whích is basically the infotmation in the past history of inflation, and the stronger form,
which includes also the available information in some other relevant variables. (Baghestani, 1992, pp.
281-282). The survey data were said to pass the weak test of rationality if they outperformed or
perfotmed as well as the inflation forecasts of the ARIMA and the stronger test if they outperformed
the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model. The latter included differences between the Consumer Price
Index in months t and t-l. His hypothesis was that the stronger test (VAR) would be valid when the
rate of inflation was perceived to be high attd volatile. The hypothesis was on the whole confirmed.
Without a good test of fit between prediction and actual outcome, this kind of test is somewhat
dubious. The logic behind the test does not seem convincing. If even the more advanced rational
expectations model has a poor performance although better than the extrapolative expectations model,
the better predictive capacity of the [SR data may not be so convincing. The results suggest that
(rational) expectations can be formed in different ways depending on the global economic situation.
Summing up the previous discussion of expectations as treated by economists one arrives at the
conclusion that all three theories can at times explain expectations, but under different circumstances.
The discussion hints that when the economic conditions are stable and do not vary much or vary in
the same way over long periods of time, for example, a long spell of steady growth, simple eztrapola-
tion of earlier development may do well.
When there is new information, implying breakdowns of earlier patterns, both extrapolative and
adaptive expectations theories fail as single explanations of actual expectations. Adaptive expectations
theory presumes that there is a correction depending on earlier discrepancies between expectations
and outcomes. The theory tnay do well in times of changing patterns like what is described as the hog-
cycle. Of course, it falters as a normative theory in such cases.
Rational expectations theory is the dominating theory and the other two theories can be seen as special
cases. Sotnetimes reliance on past ezperience is the most rational use of information as Keynes pointed
out. In the rase of producers, Keynes (1936, p. 51) expressed it like this: "..a large part of the circum-
stances usually continue substantially unchanged from one day to the next. Accordingly it is sensible
for producers to base their expectations on the assumption that the most recently realized results will
continue except in so far as there are definite reasons for ezpecting a change." Learning from earlier
misjudgments may also be rational in the sense of rational expectations theory. Most so-called tests
of rational expectations theory on empirical data are wmpatible with this idea since the crucial issue
is the agreement between ezpectations as measured in surveys and actual outcomes (L.ovell, 1986;
Baghestani, 1992; Ivaldi, 1992).7
For certain types of expectations, for example, firms' expec;tations regarding thcir own future prcxluc-
tion, an error-learning model seems appropriate according to Nerlove (1983) and Naish (1993). The
latter has shown that if rational expectatioru are replaced by adaptive expectations the loss tnay be so
insignificant that there is no need to bother with complex rationality, based on more complex and
costly information seeking. The descriptive adequacy of the error-learning model for production
expectations presumably derives from the fact that firms keep records of certain of their expectations
(they call them 'budgets'!) and do compare expectation and outcome.
Depending on what periods the tests are based on, it seems possible to confirm both extrapolative and
adaptive expectations theories. If the tests indicate that the expectations are unbiased, i.e.the error
distribution has mean 4 and that there is no relevant new information, the criteria for rationality are
also fulfilled.
4. Exptxtatioac in Psychology
4.1 Expectation-A Cognitive Concept
While economic theory makes no assumption about how past experience, whether extrapolative or
adaptive, and new information are combined in the formation of expectations, there are psychological
theories that handle the integration of past and present stimulation, the merging of past experience
and new information into one judgment.
The psychological concept of expectation belongs in cognitive theory. The basic assumption is that
expectations are fonned on the basis of past experience and available information. There may be an
emotional or motivational touch to expectations implying that the informational support for the
expectation may be of Iesser importance. Vanden Abeele (1988) distinguishes between contingent and
intentional expectations. While the individual has no control or perception of control over the events
or objects in the forrner case, there is in the second some degree of (perceived) control. Intentional
expectations are then similar to plans, goals and levels of aspiration.
Feather (1982, p. 2) expounds the general view of expectations in psychology: "People are assumed to
possess cognitive structures that concern the implications of their action, both now and in the future.
These implication sttvctures may not always be well-defined, they may be in error, and one would
expect them to vary in their details from person to person. But they are assumed to exist and, along
with subjective values, valences, or utilities, to be important determinants of goal directed behavior."
Behavioristic psychology avoids cognitive and other mental concepts. Expectancy was the concept
preferred in behavioristic theories (see e.g. Vanden Abeele, 1988). Expectancy then referred to
something inferred from observed behavior. It should be noted that the dominant expectancy-value
theories of attitude formation and change use expectancy as synonymous to expectation. Otherwise,
expectancy refers to something inferred from observations of behavior. An example of expectancy in
the behavioristic sense is when a dog running down an alley is said to have an expectancy when he
starts preparing for a curve which he cannot yet see. Certain changes in movements atxi perhaps other
overt behavior can be observed and they indicate a tendency that may be called an ezpectancy.
It seems possible to transfer expectancy in this sense to economic behavior. Changes in economic
behavior may indicate new expectancies that have import for future behavior. If there are no such
itdicator changes the assumption is that the expectancy is the same as in the preceding period. A
retailer may for example notice that consumers are spending more on consumer durables and take this
as a sign of increased optimism, tantamount to a changed ezpectancy towazds the future. A
behavioristic alternative to the Index of Consumer Sentiment (Katona, 1975) is to collect behavioral
indicators from households and business rather than asking for rather general assessments ofsituations.
The respondents would be asked to report about their behavioral changes, if any, and on their observa-
tions of changes in the environment.
Cognitive theory, in contrast, deals with expectation as a subjective concept that epitomizes what a
person anticipates from the future in a more or less well~efined respect. An expectation is not
inferred from behavior, but rather something that the irtdividual can state. When expectation is more8
of a motivational concept and contains elements of plans or goals, that is, is intentional, it can be
compared to level of aspiration, a kind of goal an individual sets for herlhimself. The level of
aspiration is susceptible to learning from the discrepancies betwcen performance and outcome (cf.
Katona, 1975).
4.2 Thc Foratation of Expectation.s according to Psychologica! Theoties
Relations between objects and between events are formed in one of three possible ways (Feather, 1982,
p. 63). One's expectation that a certain means object (A) will lead to a demanded goal object (B) may
occur (1) because all the relevant stimuli can be perceived, or (2) because one can retnember fmm
past ezperience in the same situation that A leads to B, or (3) because one can infer in a novel
situation that A leads to B from the information available. Memory of past experience, direct
observation which includes new information, and inference are thus the basis of expectations.
According to other psychological theory, these can be seen as operating together, assuming different
weights for the components. The three components are similar to the economic theories of
expectations which involve extrapolated past ezperience, inference from past experience, and new infor-
mation present in the environment.
Four types of ezpectations are distinguished in the psychological literature (Feather, 1982, pp.64-68):
(1) situation-outcome expectation, (2) action-outcome expectation, (3) action-by-situation outcome, (4)
outcome-consequence expectation. Applied to the economic context, an example of the situation-
outcome expectation would be a measure of how the economic situation of the country is expected to
change over the next twelve months. It is a contingent expectation. An example of an action-outcome
expectation would be a plan to save money for a certain goal in the future. This is tantamount to a
potential intentional expectation. The same example with the additional condition that the state of the
economy scems appropriate for saving illustrates the third type of expectation. The fourth is finally the
contingent expectation about con.cequences for oneself of certain things happening. The fotmation of
expectations is assumed to vary somewhat between the four types.
In learning theories the reinforcement of earlier behavior or of cognitive maps involving relations
between means and ends is the main impetus for the formation of ezpectations. Learning from error,
as adaptive expectations theory presumes, presupposes some kind of relation to motivation, that is,
reinforcement. On a rather superf'icial level, it can be said that cognitive linkages that have turned out
to serve in earlier situations are projected on to the future. Available new infotmation that contradicts
the earlier ezperience has to be strong to modify the linkages. Katona (1975) distinguished between
routine behavior and problem solving.While the former was the prevalent behavior and meant a habit
or routine, a simple repetition of earlier behavior, the latter which was brought forth by new infor-
tnation of some scope required new thinking. Katona applied similar ideas to expectations.
If Katona's distinction between routine behavior and problem solving is applied, expectations during
stable periods are mere repetitions of earlier ezpectations. They may be seen as habitual. If one's
income has gone up steadily over the last years, the expectation for the next year will be that the
income will go up. If there has been no change, the expectation will be no change. Only if there is new
information of some import, the expectation will be different from last time. Overreactions to certain
kinds of news may occur and incite important expectational atd behavioral changes (Andreassen,
1990). The new information may be from ezternal sources that are shared by large masses of people.
The infotmation may be news of good or bad events of a more general scope like information about
business cycles, political unrest or changes in government policies. The new information may be general
artd have special implications for the individual household, such as infotmation about changes in
unemployment, price level and interest rates.
The new information may also come from household internal sources, for example, be the fact that a
family member who has not had gainful employment starts working, a family member who has had
gainful employment stops working because of redundancy or retirement, or that a new family member
will be born. Expected changes in family conditioas influence the expectations of household financial
situation in addition to possible ezpected economy-wide changes if the latter are seen as relevant to
the household.9
In a recent paper, Bechtel et aL (1993) propose a distinction between srx~iutropic and personal
ditnensions of expectations. The term sociotropism originated in political theory and referred to the
fact that collective interests rather than personal interests could motivate a person to vote. The
authors now use it in a broader sense to designate expectations which encompass the economic
development ofthe whole economy rather than the personal or individual household financial situation.
This approach makes it interesting to study more in detail the relationships between personal and
sociotropic expectations. There is, for example, the possibility that the personal expectations may have
more of motivation in them and be truly intentional expectations. They may be less uncertain than the
sociotropic expectations, being based on more personal knowledge. They perhaps contain platu for the
future and are not only passive attempts to foresce economic development for the household.
The role of affect in the formation of ezpectations could be important. There is not room here for
more than a few ideas. The degrce of affect connectecl with different types of expectations seerns to
vary. For ezample, consequences that can be attributed to one's own actions have more emotional
contem and ego-involvement than consequences attributable to outside forces. Non-fulfillment of an
ezpectation that embodies a goal or a level of aspiration is likely to incite more fcelings of frustration
than non-fulfillment of an ezpectation regazding the national economy. Expectation is a kind of social
judgment and is as such apt to be influenced by emotion. Recent research has produced an interesting
theory of emotion in social judgments which seems appropriate to use in this connection: the Affect
Infusion Model (Forgas, 1994). This model reveals under what circumstances and how affects are
infused in social judgments.
4.3 The Combination of Earlier Experience and New Infotmation
There are psychological theories that pertain to how earlier experience and new infotmation are
combined ïn a judgment: (1) adaptation level theory (Helson, 1964; Appley, 1971), (2) information
integration theory (Anderson, 1991), (3) expectancy-value theory (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). Adaptation
level theory recognizes the possible influence of thrce types of stimuli. First, earlier ezperience of the
stimuli, treated in such a way that the most recent occurrences are most important, influences the judg-
ment. Secondly, the stimuli present in the situation have some influence. They serve as background
stimuli. Thirdly, the characteristics of the stimulus to be judged have an obvious influence. The main
point is that new stimuli are not judged in any absolute way, but are judged in relation to earlier
experience and what is present in the context which may be equivalent to competing new infotmatíon.
It is characteristic of both adaptation level theory and information integration theory that a stimulus
is not judged alone since it is always compared and integrated with an existing mass. Information
integration theory which is accompanied by a special measuring method called 'functional
measurement' is not a theory in the sense of comprising a set of psychological laws. It is rather an
approach to the empirical estimation of how stimuli of various kinds aze combined into one judgment.
An interesting finding is that, in many cases, the judgment is made by averaging rather than adding
a new stimulus to the present state. This implies that if there are many highly favorable indicators of
economic growth and one more indicator which is favorable but less so than the earlier ones, appears,
the new judgment will be less favorable than before the new favorable information became available.
With a summation principle the new judgment would become even more favorable. Information
integration theory works with ratings of stimuli and scaled judgments with the purpose of finding
stimulus weights that best explain the judgment. Levin (1985) has studied satisfaction with wages and
prices using information integration theory. Applied to judgments of economic satisfaction, the
question was: which weights given to wages change and price level change explain the satisfaction
measure best?
An interpretation of the present model in terms of information integration theory is presented in
Figure 1. The figure should be read in the following way. The thrce sets of beliefs BP, B,,, and B„ which
are based on earlier stimulation or past experience (SP), earlier degrce of ezpectation fulfillment (S,,)
and new information (S,), respectively, determine the expectation. The expectation E,,, is stated as R„
e.g.as response to a survey question. The latter implies that there may be differences between the true
value of the expectation and its verbal or other ezpression.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE10
Ezpectancy-value theory is the dominant attitude theory. It deals with beliefs, affects and behavior
related to an object or event. In this sense, it is not really a theory of how earlier ezperience and new
information combine. Some important things for the dealing with ezpectations can still be wintwwed
out from it. These models typically contain sets of 'beliefs' and of 'evaluations'. People are assumed
to have sets of salient attributes for each object to be evaluated and beliefs about how likely the object
is to display or lack the desired attributes. The subjective expected utility model can be seen as a
special case of expectancy-value models. The expectancy-value models are intent on actions and may
for this reason not be really applicable to economic expectations, in particular not to sociotropic
ezpectations. There is, however, reason to look at these models, first, because expectations can be dealt
with as a particular kirá of beliefs which wncern the future; secondly, because the role that
expectations can play for actions can be elucidated by means of such theories. The latter is, however,
beyond the scope of this paper.
The study of ezpectations can also be informed by another kind of attitude theory. Attitudes are often
held to consist of three components: belief(s) about an object, affect towards the object, and the
tendency to action towazds the object (conative component). Ajun and Fishbein ( 1980) have developed
an expectancy-value theory of attitudes in which [he three above-mentioned attitude components enter.
The conative component which in Ajun and Fishbein's theory is a function of the other two
components is represented by intention. The latter is held to be the main predictor of actual behavior
towards an object.
Ajun (1985, 1991) has added the component perceivedcontro! and calls the new theory 'the theory of
planned behavior'. Ajun's theory of planned behavior embraces some ideas that can be applied in the
study of ezpectations. According to Ajun, an attitude consists of (a) behavioral beliefs, which are
assumed to influence attitudes towazd the behavior, (b) nonnative beliefs, which constitute the
underlying determinants of subjective norms and (3) control beliefs, which provide the basis for
perceptions of behavioral control. A person is assumed to hold a limited number of salient beliefs
about an object, eight to ten at the most. The behavioral beliefs are of two kinds: beliefs about the
costs and benefits of engaging in the behavior (instrumental beliefs) and beliefs about positive or
negative feelings derived from the behavior (affective beliefs).
In a way, the degree of perceived control defines whether an attitude or expectation is a plan for
behavior against the object. When the individual has a strong control, an expectation becomes similaz
to a goal or level of aspiration. It is intentional and can be adaptive. From level of aspiration studies
it is well-known that deviations of outcomes from expectations have strong motivational force
(Brickman and Campbell, 1971). The setting of new levels of aspiration is influenced by earlier discrep-
ancies. Again, this is the psychological concept of error-learning.
S. Some F~u~ttter Notes on the Model
5.1 Extrapolative, Adaptive and Rational Expedations
As presented above, the model of expectation formation suggests three new things about the fotmation
of economic expectations:
I. Expectations are in principle weighted combinations
between past experience and new information about the immedi-
ate and more distant environment
2. New information is always present, but its usefulness and use may vary
considerably. In some situations, the role of new information for the formation of
expectations seems to be exaggerated by rational expectations theory
3. Expectations have an adaptive component if the expectations are inten-
tional, that is, there is some degree of perceived control over the expected event.
Expectations will thus depend on:11
I. Past experience, used in more or less sophisticated ways. Eztrapolation of earlier outcomes can be
made on the basis of objective data on, for example, unemployment, income changes, stock exchange
rates and consumer price indexes, depending on what expectation is asked for. Past experience as
perceived by the respondent may not wholly coincide with the objective data, due to errors of
perception or selective exposure. The expectation or expectation component may be more or less
independent of earlier stated subjective ezpectations. Eztrapolation of earlier stated subjective
ezpectations is,however, sometirttes a possibility. Such extrapolation can either be seen as remembered
responses elicited by the same stimuli as in earlier situations or as response patterns, for example,
always expecting little or no change or consistently pessimistic or optimistic expectations (cf. Bechtel
et al.,1993). If there are no new developments in the economy, the basic component is past ezperience
which can be interpreted in different ways, for example, weighting recent developments more heavily
(cf. Helson's concept of adaptation level).
2. Adaptive ezpectations are based on a comparison between earlier subjective ezpectation and actual
outcome. When the expectation is similar to a goal, a level of aspiration, and the degree of fulfillment
is low, there may be some learning from the discrepancies. It scettts rather unlikely that people in
general would remember their stated expectations in such a clear way that they can make a real
comparison with actual outcomes, unless there is a strong motivational factor attached to it, for
example personal prestige in predicting price level changes (inflation). This may also be the case when
an income ezpectation is at the same time a level of aspiration, what the person wants to achieve. The
respondem in a survey may then remember herlltis aspired change in, for example, income and
experience some emotion, especially if the level of aspiration is not achieved. It does not seem very
likely that, for ezample, price expectations are usually formed through an error-learning process of this
kind or for that matter, that any sociotropic expectations are.
Adaptive ezpectations should be more typical of business firms than of consumers. The former prepare
budgets for sales, production etc. and afterwards compare budget and outcome. Consumer ezpectations
regarding, say,saving for the purchase of a house may belong to the same category.
3. New infotmation about the economy or about one's own situation. The role of the new infortnation
can be seen as a change in belief or an addition to the existing salient beliefs. The new information
is weighed against earlier experience. The wider the implications in terms of outcomes and
consequences and the higher their probability, the more weight will be attached to the new infotmation
in the determination of the expectation. It is convenient to see this as a weighting question since there
is always some new infortnation and necessarily selective treatment of the infortnation according to
well-known laws of attention and perception (see e.g. Anderson, 1990; Simon,1990).
5.2 The Role of New Information
In simple cases the weights of two components of the model are equal to zero. If there is no earlier
direct or generali7able ezperience, the expectation will be based on interpreted new infortnation. If
there is no new infon-ttation, past experience will prevail, either as extrapolation or as error-learning,
the latter when there is some motive for learning from experience such as the non-fulfillment of a plan.
The reasoning on the basis of the model becomes more complex when the interdependences of the sets
of beliefs are considered. For ezample, an expectation may be a plan even though there is no earlier
experience or learning. The degrce of perceived control will depend on generalization of earlier
learning and on what the available information conveys about possible degrce of control of the future
situation. The new expectation will then depend on the other two sets of beliefs. The next time this
expectation is formed the degrce of fulfillment ofthe first expectationlplan willbe important at:cording
to the model.
The model makes it possible to reconcile under one theory the findings that consumers seem to have
two sets of perceptions of price rises. Wárneryd (1986) and Hudson (1989) find that when consumets
have bcen asked about how much prices of baskets of goods have gone up, they tend to give highly
exaggerated estimates. When asked about how much prices in general have gone up, the average
estimates come pretty close to the actual outcome (cf.lonung, 1981). While the fotmer perception and
expectation are based on direct experience, the latter may be inspired by the mass tnedia and personal
communication (see also discussion in Maital attd Maital, 1981). In terms of the model, the weight12
of immediate past experience dominates the weights of the other sets of beliefs in the first tase while
in the second the weight of the new information prevails.
The concept of 'credibility' which is very important in the new classical macroeconomics translates to
the more tractable question of what value the weight of the new information will get. This weight is
a composite of weights of the different pieces of information in the given situation. Although there are
few studies of the selection and use of economic information, there is some knowledge about how
people receive infotmation in the mass communication and advertising literature (sce e.g. van Raaij,
1989; van Raaij, van Veldhoven and Wiirneryd, 1988; Zullow, 1991).
The model is meant in the first place to be descriptive and serve as a basis for the measurement of
individual expectations in surveys. [t can be dealt with as a norrnative rational model for individual
behavior. The rational indivídual is then assumed to assign weights to herlltis sets of beliefs in such
a way that optimal use of the infotmation in past experience, past errors of judgment and new
information ensues. Rational ezpectations theory assumes that there is no correlation between
prediction error and any available information. It makes psychological sense to assume that an
individual sometimes trusts only herll~s earlier experience, sometitnes learns something from earlier
mistakes and successes, and in other cases knows that it is necessary to react to new information. The
cobweb theorem may be more of an invention than a description of reality! Maybe 'hog cycles' were
an extremely rare ezception. The rational expectatioas theory appears to underestimate or even neglect
the rational use of past experience and earlier errors. These can be rationally used alongside new
information. By definition there can be no earlier errors to learn from if the individual makes rational
use of all infonnation, but new events during the period covered by the expectation can conceivably
cause the expectation to miss the outcome (see the earlier quotation from Lovell, 1986).
The developments in the real estate and financial markets in the late 1980's illustrate how past
experience of great successes is sticky and how difficult it is for new information to have an effect on
ezpectations. Past experiertce of adverse conditions may have even stickier consequences for
expectations as the difficulties of getting out of the present crisis indicate. If information is integrated
through averaging rather than summation, the process of changing ezpectations is delayed. How can
the new information suggesting improving conditions be made convincing enough to instil more
optimistic expectations among investors?
Studies of factors influencing economic expectations show that such factors as changes in degrce of
unemployment, interest rates, stock ezchange rates, and other news, mostly transmitted by the mass
media have influence (van Raaij, 1989). These factors are likely to have a direct influence on the socio-
tropic expectations. It seems reasonable to suppose that the sociotropic expectations have some
influence on the personal expectations. It can also be the other way round: that expectations of
personal success or failure color sociotropic expectations. In general, the economic situation of the
country, with unemployment changes as an important dimension, undoubtedly can influence the
expectations of the development of the household financial situation.
There may, however, be reasons for discrepancies between the two expectations. The financial situation
rnay be expected to deteriorate even though the household income is expected to increase as a conse-
quence ofglobal economic growth. An expected increase in expenditures may explain the discrepancy.
There are many possibilities for increased ezpenditures such as interest rates on mortgages going up,
the imminent necessity of buying a new automobile or consurner durables, moving to new living quar-
ters, a new family member is born or the children start their education at the parents's expense. There
may also be reasons for an improved financial situation despite no change or even a decrease in
income. The fact that children move out or that the head of the household retires may be such cases.
[t may involve moving to cheaper living quarters. Saving, especially goal saving to buy something
special, may influence the expectations of household financial situation. Due to change of jobs and
promotion the financial situation of the household may change independently of the general economic
situation.
It is necessary to distinguish between expectations about things to which something can be done and
about things or rather events to which nothing can be done. Certain events may be expected and
unavoidable apart from their bringing costs or benefits. There may be situations in which actions can13
alleviate or, if there are benefits, enhance the consequences. There may be situations where nothing
can be done. !f there are expectations of bad tirttes, even a depression, the effects can at least be
alleviated by for example saving money in advartce. The degree of control is probably an itnportant
dimension for some expectations.
Expectations at the macro level and the micro level can differ. Some intraindividual differences due
to personal circumstances and events willcancel out when individuals are aggregated over a population,
but usually not all differences. Katona (1975) talked about situations when Iarge segments of the
population act in the same manner, influencod by the mass media. He called the phenomenon 'social
leaming'. Social learning meant that large groups of people reacted in the same way to cettain
infotmation. The only way to forecast such phenomena was to interview a representative sample of the
population.
The sociotropic expectations should be a better predictor of economic development than the petsonal
expectations. Bechtel et al.(1993) recommend closer attention to the differences. The personal expecta-
tions may, however, be important for distinguishing different segments in the population that may react
differently to economic stimuli.
5.3 An Illustr~ation of the Use of the Model
As a simple illustration, the model is applied to some Dutch data on consumers' income expectations.
Some further implications of the model are being tested in a more elaborate way using the same data
(W~rneryd and Grcenland, 1995). The Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) publishes an Index
of Consumer Expectations, based on monthly surveys. Figure 2 displays the April and October values
of this Index from April 1984 to April 1991. The Willingness to Buy curve corresponds to the personal
component of the Index and relies on questions about the household financial situation and a question
about whether it is a favorable time to buy durables. The curves suggest that the formation processes
may have varied over the period.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Unrelated to the surveys for the Index, the Socioeconomic Panel (SEP) of the Dutch CBS has for
many years wllected individual data from a large sample of Dutch households. Data from the period
April 1984 - April 1991 are used to illustrate the use of the model. With the exception of 1990 and
1991 interviews were conducted in April and October each year. The respondents in the SEP are in
each interview wave asked about income changes over the last twelve months and income expectations
for the coming twelve months.
The idea behind the use of the data is that in certain time periods the income expectation can be quite
well explained through earlier past experience and degree of fulfillment of the expectation. In time
periods, in which new information is more important than anything else the explanatory value will be
lower. ln principle, data on new information can be ascertained through news media analysis or asking
respondents about exposure to information. Unfortunately, such data are not easily available. The
regression equation is hence simply:
EXP,~, - constant f J3,EXP, t~Z(APP, - EXP~ f u
where EXP,t, is income expectation for the next twelve months (1-strongly increase, 2-increase,
3-no change, 4-decrease, 5-strongly decrease)
EXP, is income expectation twelve months earlier for period ending at t(same categories as
above)
APP, is appraisal, (perceived) income change over the last twelve months (l-considerably
better, 2-somewhat better, 3-no change, 4-somewhat worse, 5-considerably worse)
u is an error termIa
Table I presents the results of regression analyses for each year's income ezpectalion. The dependent
variable on the row April 85 is the income ezpectation (EXP,,,) for the nezt twelve months, stated in
April 1985 and so on. Unstandardized regression ccefficents (B), standard errors (SE), and
standardized ccefficients (Beta) are given for the independent variables income expectation stated
twelve months earlier (EXPt) and the discrepancy between this expectation and the appraisal
(perceived outcome; APP, -EXP,).
The two independent variables which roughly correspond to two belief sets in the model presented
above, explain different amounts of variance in expectations over the time period from April 1985 to
April 1991. The RZ's vary from .080 to .216,with the lowest values towards the end of the period. This
hints that the influence of new information was strongest at the end of the period. According to Figure
2, the Index of Consumer Expectations stazted to drop in Oct. 1989 and continued to drop in 1990 and
1991. There were expectations about a coming recession, presutnably inspired by mass media and
personal information which was in some conflict with earlier experience. ludging from the variations
in the B's and Beta's, the contributions of the independent variables to explaining variance also varied
considerably. The strongest variations are noted for the discrepancy measure, with Beta's varying from
.114 to .357.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The analyses illustrate that there is variation in the importance of past experience and earlier
discrepancies between expectations and outcomes. When compared to Ihe two curves in Figure 2, the
differences seem to make sense. There is, for ezample, variation in how much the two variables explain
which presumably depends on the varying role of new information. In 1990-1991, the first information
about the approaching recession was spreading. Past experience became less important in ezpectation
formation.
6. Soroe Implications for Economic-Psycóological Researcó on Expectations
The simple model suggested leads to a number of considerations concerning measurement, substance
hypotheses, and theory development on the basis of empirical data. The crucial feature is the possibility
of assessing the weights of the model in such a way that changes in the fortnation of expectations can
be noted and forecast. There is already some information on conditions under which expectations
become more complex (Baghestani, 1992). There is also some information on the degree of (perceived)
control that decides whether adaptive expectations models aze plausible. The model entails that
sociotropic expectations will rarely be adaptive.
The intriguing question is when the dominance ofpast experience is replaced with beliefs based on new
information. From a behavioral point of view, the problem is to find appropriate measures that can
indicate when new information becomes so engrossing that it dominates expectation formation. It
should be noted that this dces not only refer to beliefs about the consequences of changes in the
respondent's household conditions, but also to sociotropic dimensions.
With respect to measurement, it should first be said that attempts at finding ways to assess phenomena
without having to approach individuals on a large scale are laudable in themselves. Unless there is a
good understanding of how ezpectations are formed by individuals, there is, however, not much chance
of finding stable relationships between phenomena (cf. Simon, 1984). At the individual level, it seems
important to make more of a distinction between sociotropic and personal dimensions in ezpectations.
The use of the sociotropic concept implies that there is no control or perception of control whereas
the personal dimension may or may not hold elements of personal control as a response to changes
in sociotropic expectations.
At the aggregate level two types of indicators ofconsumer confidence are used. One is based on some
simple questions about financial expectations about the economy and the household and is often pub-
lished as 'Index of Consumer Expectations'(see e.g. van Raaij and Gianotten, 1990). The other is based
on the frequency of buying plans. While economists tend to believe more in the latter type of indicator,
the Index seetns to perform somewhat better in terms of forecast errors (Vanden Abeele, 1988).
Expectations related to buying consumer durables aze collected through questions about plans and thusls
involve a high degree of control. The yuestions used in surveys are nowadays quite elaborate and
presume estimates of purchase probabilities. Although the reported plans are to a large extent fulfilled,
most of the actual purchasers are recruited from the group that stated low or no probabiliry of buying.
One implication is that even plans for large purchases have a short gestation before they are actualized
or forsaken and that questions should be framed so as to observe rather short time horizons. Another
implication is that there may be a difference between a plan and other types of expectations. There
is a difference between asking:"Do you plan to buy..[wnsumer durable] during the next sixmonths" and
"Do you think that you may buy..[consumer durable~ during the nezt six months?"
Another consideration pertains to the information requested from the respondents in a study. It is
desirable to ask respondents about events in their own personal surroundings that can affect their
personal expectations of, for example, income and financial situation. To this may be added questions
about events of economy-wide importance. Some such questions are included in the EEC regular
surveys (see e.g. van Raaij and Gianotten, 1990). The model suggests that the impottance of such
infomtation should be weighed against past experience. It is easy to visualize a new type of questions
in expectation surveys. These relate to the importance of news events, and to how far one can trust
one's earlier experience and whether something can be learned from earlier successes and failures
when there is at least some degree of perceived control of the events.
Based on earlier psychological and economic research, some hypotheses about the varying roles of the
three belief sets in the model were mentioned. It should be possible to cull from the literature more
ideas about when new information has such an importance that it overshadows past experience.
Laboratory experimentation along the lines used in testing information integration theory could provide
some insights into how expectations are formed on the basis of past experience and new information
(Anderson, 1991). At the macro level, this is a matter of information being considered important by
large groups of people; this is what Katona (I975) called 'social learning'. In the literature about level
of aspiration phenomena, there is something to learn about expectations when they are similar to plans
(Brickman and Campbell, 1971; Katona, Strumpel, and Zahn, 1971).
Many tests of implications of the model require that data on expectations and reali7ations aze available
for individualslhouseholds and for different periods characterized by different degrees of uncertainty.
New important and relevant information can increase or decrease the degree of individual uncertainty
depending on how specific the kind of information is. For postdiction and development of theory it
may be possible to find empirical indicators of such factors that influence expectations more than past
experience, but this can be difficult to achieve for predictive purposes.
7. Conclusions
In economics, the commonly discussed theories ofexpectation fomiation--simple extrapolative, adaptive
and rational expectations--are often treated as mutually exclusive. Psychological theories of judgments
and attitude formation tend to emphasize that such phenomena are complex and composite. The judg-
ment of a stimulus is influenced by earlier experience and the judgment is hence relative rather than
absolute. Expressed in somewhat different terms, past experience and learning are integrated with new
information into a single value judgment. There is also a more or less pronounced touch of affect in
ezpectations like in other social judgments (Forgas, 1994). The model propounded here is based on
these psychological ideas and handles expectations as being based on three sets of beliefs, one set
corresponding to extrapolation of earlier experience, a second set being adaptive in the sense of
learning from earlier successes and failures, a third set based on new infomiation in the situation. Past
experience is combined with new information according to the model. It makes psychological sense to
assume that in some cases past experience dominates, in other cases new information takes over. This
implies that expectations as measured in surveys and other contexts where people are asked about their
expectations can be a combination in which different sets of beliefs are weighed against one another
and that it may be desirable to find out more about these sets.
ln terms of the model proposed, the economic theories of expectations are thus handled under one
theory. In the light of empirical evidence, rational expectations theory seems to overdo the importance
of new information for forming expectations. Expectations based on past ezperience seem to be sticky.
Whatever the definition of rational, under certain conditions it must be rational to have only16
extrapolative expectations, at other times adaptive, and at a third type of time.e to have expectations
purely based on new information. Psychological level of aspiration theory and the theory of planrted
behavior suggest that adaptive expectations occur when there is some degrce of perceived control and
planning in an expectation. When expectations are sociotropic this is usually not the case and the
influence of adaptive error-learning would be minimal.
The use of averages or aggregates for a whole economy may hide important differences among
population groups. Katona (1975) advised against the use of the single Irxlex of Consumer Sentiment
attd advocated the simultaneous use of other information collected in the surveys. The idea of belief
components invokes the ídea that different population segments may form their expedations at a
certain point in time in different manners. If people act in accordance with their expectations, the
aggregate outcome may be unexpected, depending on the weight of each segment. Katona (1975)
talked about 'social learning' effects in a similar way.
While the model was developed with macroeconomic applications as a primary aim, it can be used to
elucidate some problems in the study of consumer behavior as well. When a consumer faces a new
product, an expectation about its performance develops as one dimension in its further progress
towards acceptance or rejection. How are such expectations fotmed? How is earlier experience weighed
against the new information provided from different sources, partial arxi impartial?
The model is not testable in itself and can hardly be rejected through any form of crucial test, but,
utilizing earlier research in economics and psychology, it leads to a ntunber of hypotheses for empirical
testing. If the hypotheses are cortsistently rejected, this would cast serious doubt on the model's validity
and usefulness.17
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Table 1. Unstandardized Regression Ccefficients (B), Standard Errors, and Standardized Regreasion
Coefficients (Beta) for Income Expectation EXP,,, with Eartier Expedation (EXPJ and Discrepancy
between Appraisal (APP,; Perceived Outcome) and EXP, as Independent VariaWes; N Is the Number
of Respondents in Each Sample Using only Heads of Households and Single Households
EXP, (stated at t-n APP, - EXP, Adj.
B SE Beta B SE Beta
R'
N
Apri185 .4742 .0168 .5153 -.3175 .0162 -.3566 .2161 3069
Oct.85 .4488 .0169 .5079 -.3060 .0174 -.3375 .1997 2939
Apri186 .3701 .0183 .4219 -.2195 .0171 -.2692 .1335 2687
Od.86 .4285 .0164 .4689 -.2387 .0157 -.2726 .1639 3493
AprII87 .3752 .0163 .3900 -.2035 .O146 -.2367 .1141 4135
Oct.87 .4965 .0160 .4757 -.3085 .0146 -.3226 .1880 4405
April88 .4195 .0162 .4167 -.2277 .0148 -.2480 .1363 4327
Od.88 .4200 .0145 .4669 -.2089 .0142 -.2372 .1547 4551
Apri189 .3540 .O151 .3743 -.1567 .0138 -.ISl2 .1094 4484
Oct.89 .3976 .0163 .3850 -.1954 .0151 -.2094 .1136 4625
Apri190 .3268 .0203 .3145 -.1371 .0163 -.1136 .0801 2989
Apri191 .3765 .0195 .3416 -.2265 .0159 -.2522 .0898 3986No. Author(s)
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